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THE "TRUTH-IN-NEGOTIATING" CLAUSE OF P.L. 87-653
AS INTERPRETED BY THE ARMED SERVICES
BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
Amidst a storm of controversy there was enacted into law on September 10, 1962, Public Law 87-653,1 which was intended to increase
formal advertising whenever possible and, where justification exists for
the use of negotiated procurement, to supply appropriate safeguards for
Government protection against inflated cost and pricing estimates.2 Provisions for the latter purpose were inserted to require "truth-in-negotiating,"'3 but the terminology of the bill is so ambiguous that perhaps it has
created more problems than it has solved.
I.

HISTORY

In 1959, audits of Department of Defense (DOD) negotiated contracts by the General Accounting Office (GAO) revealed that the prices
charged by some contractors had resulted in unwarranted profits which
would not have occurred had Government negotiators been in possession
of the current, complete, and accurate pricing data which was available
to the contractors. 4 In support of its findings, GAO's report to Congress
enumerated specific examples occurring during the preceding year (1958)
in which the Government had obtained millions of dollars in refunds. 5
Taking cognizance of GAO's report to Congress, DOD decided to
revise its policies and procedures relative to its negotiated contracts by
requiring the disclosure of current, complete, and accurate data by the contractor.6 The result of this decision was a substantial revision of Armed
Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) Section III, Part 8, entitled
Price Negotiation Policies and Techniques. 7 ASPR 3.807-28 was amended
to require the contractor to furnish the Government negotiating team with
current, complete, and correct cost or pricing data as it became available
throughout the negotiation process. At the same time, an entirely new
1. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964).

2. Letter from Gen. Counsel for the Dep't of Defense to the Chairman, Senate

Armed Services Comm., July 13, 1962, U.S. CODt CONG. & AD. Niws 2480.
3. 108 CONG. Rzc. 9973 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Vinson).
4. Hearings Pursuant to Sec. 4, P.L. 86-89, Before the Special Subcomm. on
Procurement Practices of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
64-70 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 Hearings] ; S. REP. No. 1884, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1962).
5. 1960 Hearings 64-70. Most of the overcharges on the contracts were incurred

in the airframe and missile industries, and especially in the "fixed-price incentive" type
contract. Id. at 125, 685; H.R. RisP. No. 1797, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1960).
6. 1960 Hearings 166-67, 214-15.
7. Id. at 145-55. ASPR is issued under the authority of the Armed Services
Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-14 (1964), and represents the most significant
procurement regulations to be considered by defense contractors and subcontractors.
See generally J. PAUL, UNITXD STATEs GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS & SUBCONTRACTS 20,

31-32 (1964).
8. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-2 (1967)

(Requirement for price or cost analysis).
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subsection, ASPR 3.807-7, 9 was added prescribing the form of the
newly required Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data.
In 1960 the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, disturbed by the contents of the GAO audit reports, conducted hearings
to determine the extent of the deficiencies in DOD negotiation procedures
with regard to inaccurate pricing data. 10 Representative Vinson, on
June 8, 1960, introduced H.R. 12572;11 that resolution passed the House
on June 24,12 but was not acted on by the Senate before the adjournment
of the 86th Congress. H.R. 12572 was reintroduced in the 87th Congress
as H.R. 5532. Again the resolution was passed by the House,'13 and on
July 19, 1962, Chairman Vinson made a lengthy statement in support of
it before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He noted that the
requirements of the resolution were already contained in ASPR but,
relying on information supplied by the GAO, 14 indicated that the certificate
of data was not being used to the degree Congress desired. 15 H.R. 5532
was enacted into law as Public Law 87-653, approved September 10,
1962.16
9. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-4 (1967) (Certificate of current cost or pricing data).
11. 106 CONG,. Rec. 12,169 (1960); H.R. RrP. No. 1797, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
10. 1960 Hearings.

(1960).

12. 106 CONG. RIc. 14,255-58 (1960).
13. When presented to the House, Congressman Smith, who did not feel that
bill was a "step in the right direction," stated that it came from the Committee withthea
minority report of three members, whereas "all previous bills from the great Committee on Armed Services have always been reported unanimously by that committee."
108 CONG. Rie. 9967-68 (1962).
14. S.RtP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).
15. Hearings on H.R. 5532 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1962). "Now listen to these figures: Of 364 prime contracts
entered

into since the regulations were adopted, 121 of them having a total value of
$253 million had no certified-cost-data as the regulations require."
16. 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1964). Prior to the enactment of P.L. 87-653, Congress
received letters opposing passage on various grounds. The Department of Defense
felt that an inordinate burden was placed on the contractor. Letter from Gen. Counsel
for the Dep't of Defense to the Chairman, Senate Armed Services Comm., July 13,
1962, U.S. CODs CONG. & AD. News 2483.
DOD also felt that the bill was unnecessary since ASPR adequately covered
the subject matter. Id. at 2484. There has been considerable question, however, as to
the binding effect of regulations not specifically incorporated into the contract. At the
time that P.L. 87-653 was enacted, judicial decisions indicated that procurement regulations not specifically incorporated into the contract were not contractually binding.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 565 (Ct. Cl. 1955);
Caskel Forge, Inc., ASBCA No. 7638, 1962 BCA 3318; Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc.,
IBCA Nos. 36, 50, 59-1 BCA 2110; Vevier Loose Leaf Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 1500
(1953). Subsequent to passage of this bill, however, there has been some indication
that such regulations are deemed incorporated into the contract and are therefore
binding. G.L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963);
see J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS & SUBCONTRACTS 7, 34 (1964).
Others also opposed the bill as unnecessary. See, e.g., Statement of the Aerospace
Industries Ass'n, Hearings on H.R. 5532, supra note 15, at 105-07; Statement of H.M.
Horner, Chairman of United Aircraft Corp., id. at 107-10; Statement of Machinery
and Allied Products Institute, id. at 113-14; Letter from Nat'l Aeronautics & Space
Administration to the Chairman, Senate Armed Services Comm., August 8, 1962,
U.S. COD CONG. & AD. NEws 2486.
Strong support for P.L. 87-653 came from the Comptroller General, who
indicated that ASPR was not accomplishing its desired objectives. Letter from
Comptroller General of the United States to the Chairman, Senate Armed Services
Comm., July 17, 1962, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Ngws 2490, 2495. In a well-written
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The law added a new subsection, (f), to 10 U.S.C. § 2306 requiring
that a prime contractor or subcontractor submit cost or pricing data under
certain circumstances prior to the award of a negotiated contract; such
data shall be certified to be "accurate, complete and current."" The certification requirement applies when the contract, change, or modification to
the contract will exceed $100,000; it also applies to a subcontract exceeding
$100,000 if the prime contractor is required to submit a certificate. The
importance of the certificate lies in its proviso that the price certified to
the Government shall be adjusted to exclude significant sums by which
the head of the agency determines the price was increased due to deficient
data.' 8
The Act has been implemented by regulations 9 which require that
a "truth-in-negotiating" certificate be submitted prior to the award of a
cost-reimbursable, 20 incentive, 21 or price redeterminable 22 contract, regardand persuasive article, the argument has been advanced that the only thing necessary,
both before and after enactment of the bill, is for GAO to discharge its statutory duty
to inspect the books and records of contractors and subcontractors under negotiated
procurements with limited or no competition. McClelland, Negotiated Procurement

and the Rule of Law: The Fiasco of Public Law 87-653, 32 FORDHAM L.
Rev. 411,
412-13, 441 (1964). Many cases indicating a need for the "truth-in-negotiating"
provision were cited at the hearings on P.L. 87-653. Hearings on H.R. 5532,
supra note

15, at 16-18, 29. However, inthe majority of these cases, virtually

no attempt was
made to verify prices submitted by contractors. Hearings on Weapons
Systems
Management Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services,
86th
1st Sess. 346, 632 (1959) ; McClelland, supra at 441. DOD itself has impliedCong.,
itsdeterminations filedwith GAO in support of its negotiated procurements that
rarely questioned because the latter's audits are so highly selective. S. RZP. No. are
4,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1961). See also 1960 Hearings 571; Hearings on
Weapons

System Management, supra at 346, 380, 673.
17. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964). For the complete text of 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f)
(1964) see appendix.
18. The problems actually faced by the contractor have been neatly categorized
into five departments: (1) invasion of privacy (cost information is of
nature and is extremely important to a company's competitive position), a(2)proprietary
adminis-

trative burden (additional accounting, administrative and legal personnel
are sometimes required, resulting in additional costs), (3) subcontract problems
(the prime
contractor is exposed to a contingent liability against which he may
protect himself), (4) uncertainty in terms (the meaning of the clause andnot be able to
to be applied are ambiguous), and (5) the problem of obtaining "fair the standards
and reasonable
prices" (the profit margin is too slight to cover non-allowable costs, such
and development costs and proprietary rights). Pettit, The Defective as research
and Implementing Regulations - A Year and a Half Later, 29 LAW Pricing Law
& CONT4MP.
PROB. 552, 557-61 (1964). See also Cuneo & Crowell, Negotiated
Contracts - TwoStep Procurement, Cost and Pricing Data Requirements
and Protests to the Comptroller General, 5 B.C. InD. & CoM. L. Rnv. 43, 59 (1963).
19. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3 (1967) (Cost or pricing data).
20. Cost-reimbursement contracts "[provide] for payment
to the contractor of
allowable costs incurred in the performance of the contract, to the extent
prescribed
in the contract." ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.405-1 (1967). Estimates of
established for the dual purpose of obligating funds and establishing total cost are
ceilings which
can be exceeded by the contractor without prior approval or later ratification
by the
contracting officer, only at the contractor's own risk. Cost-reimbursement
contracts
are employed when the costs cannot be estimated with the degree of accuracy
required
for the use of fixed-price contracts. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.405-1(b)
(1967).
21. A fixed-price incentive contract "isa fixed-price type contract
with provision for adjustment of profit and establishment of the final contract
price by a
formula based on the relationship which final negotiated total cost
bears to total
target costs." ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.404-4 (1967) (Fixed-price incentive
contracts).
This type contract is frequently used in research and development or
for items not
previously produced, and serves as an aid to the contractor in financing
the work.
22. A price redeterminable contract may be either prospective or retroactive.
If
the former, itprovides "for a firm fixed price for an initial
period
of contract deliveries
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,
1968
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less of dollar amount; prior to the award of any "firm fixed-price or
fixed-price with escalation negotiated contract" that may be in excess of
$100,000; prior to any contract modification expected to involve more
than $100,000, regardless of whether the original contract was negotiated
or formally advertised; and in situations where the negotiated contract or
modification is not expected to exceed $100,000, when the contracting
officer so requires.
Before an examination of the specific problems encountered in the
implementation of the certification provisions, it should be noted that
there are six exceptions to the above requirements for the certificate :23
(1) Formally advertised contracts - the necessity for current, complete and accurate data does not exist here;
(2) Negotiated fixed-price contracts under $100,000 - it would be
too burdensome to obtain data for all contracts of this size;
(3) Negotiated fixed-price contracts over $100,000 "where the price
negotiated is based on adequate price competition" - this terminology
is undefined, but "adequate price competition" probably can be established
when two or more sources are available ;24
(4) Negotiated fixed-price contracts over $100,000 where the price
negotiated is based on "established catalog or market prices of commercial
items sold in substantial quantities to the general public" 25 - required
here are substantial commercial sales, not including sales to the Government, based on established prices;
(5) Prices set by law or regulation - this exception probably is
not available to contractors since it applies to such things as public
utilities;
(6) Exceptional cases where the head of the agency waives the
requirements.
II.

BURDEN OF PROOF

American Bosch Arma Corp.20 was the first case to be heard by the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) 27 relative to the
or performance and for prospective price redetermination either upward or downward

at a stated time or times during the performance of the contract." ASPR, 32 C.F.R.
§ 3.404-5 (1967) (Prospective price redetermination at a stated time or times during
performance). This type contract is used in quantity production or services contracts
where fair and reasonable prices may be negotiated for an initial period but not for
later periods of performance.

If retroactive, there is provision "for a ceiling price

and retroactive price redetermination after completion of the contract." ASPR, 32
C.F.R. § 3.404-7 (1967) (Retroactive price redetermination after completion). The
retroactive type contract is used when it is impossible to establish fair and reasonable
prices at the time of negotiation and the amount involved is so small or the time for
performance is so short that it is not feasible to use any other type contract.
23. See Cuneo & Crowell, supra note 18, at 56.
24. Id.
25. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964).
26. ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA ff 5280.
27. ASBCA is an administrative board established "for the purpose of con-

sidering appeals from the decisions of contracting
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/6
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pre-statutory defective pricing clause. 28

The contracting officer ordered
a price reduction on the grounds that the overstatement of the target
price and a failure to disclose current cost information that was reasonably
available during the contract price negotiations on a $15 million fixed-price
incentive contract had resulted in an unwarranted profit of $45,529.29
On appeal, ASBCA placed the burden on the Government to establish:
(1) that the contractor furnished inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent
data in the price negotiation; (2) that because of this defective data,
the negotiated price was increased; and (3) the precise dollar amount by
which the negotiated price was increased.
The facts were that on March 22, 1960, the Ballistics Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command (BSD) negotiation team requested
American to submit a cost quotation on two missile guidance sets containing very complex types of electronic equipment. American's initial
proposal was submitted on April 5, but BSD subsequently amended its
request for proposals five times. On May 31, American submitted its
proposal on 49 units. Air Force auditors reviewed this proposal during
the week of June 10, and its subsequently prepared audit report contained
no exceptions to any of the figures on the costs of purchased parts reflected
in American's May 31 proposal. In August, the contractor was advised
by BSD that a new contract would be issued for 60 missile guidance sets
in lieu of increasing any existing contract. American furnished all the
required "back-up" information, none of which related to the costs of
materials. Although no demand was made and no further cost or pricing
data was submitted by the contractor, during the period from May 31
to the completion of negotiations all of American's data was available
to the Air Force auditors on demand.
The Government clearly met its burden of showing that inaccurate,
incomplete, and noncurrent data had been submitted by American.
American used the data contained in its May 31 proposal for the September negotiations without reflecting the lower prices which could have
dispute clauses." 2 CCH GOV'T CONT. RP.
23,050, at 11,241 (1968). For a discussion of the procedure, jurisdiction, and decision-making processes of ASBCA, see
ch. XVIII of J. PAUL, UNITED STrATrs GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS & SUBCONTRACTS
(1964).
28. As used throughout this Comment, the pre-statutory defective pricing clause

refers to the 1959 version of ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-4 (Certificate of cost or
pricing data). As noted earlier, P.L. 87-653, which made mandatory the defective
pricing clause, was not enacted until 1962.
29. In 1960, the House Armed Services Subcommittee was given a detailed
analysis by the Director of Procurement and Production, Headquarters, Air Materiel
Command, Dayton, Ohio, of the procedures followed by the Air Force in negotiating
target costs and prices on fixed-price incentive contracts. The Air Force negotiating
team consists of about 15 people on the average, "all of them experts," being "better
than the contractor's people by far." Prior to the commencement of negotiations, the
team constructs its own price "just as the contractor would construct it himself,"
having done it "independently." This independently constructed price is so low that
the contractor "wouldn't have a prayer of making it unless he did something really
drastic." The contractor is then required to submit his cost proposal in detail and
negotiations are conducted "across the table" until the negotiators arrive at a mutually
Published byacceptable
Villanova University
Charles
Widger
School364-65.
of Law Digital Repository, 1968
target price.
1960
Hearings
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been obtained on various parts subsequent to its original proposal and
prior to final negotiations. However, the question of causality between
the defective data and the increased price posed a more difficult problem.
Prior to the commencement of negotiations, the BSD negotiation
team had independently arrived at its own price in much the same
manner as a prime contractor might have, considering all available
information, including the Air Force audit of American's May 31 proposal. BSD assumed that the cost of materials to the contractor would
be the same as his most recent experiences and did not anticipate the
reductions which occurred in the June to August period. 3° If BSD had
relied exclusively on its independently constructed price there could be no
price adjustment under the clause, even though the contractor had supplied
defective data, since without reliance, that data could not have caused
an increase in the negotiated price. Notwithstanding this virtually independently constructed price which BSD used in subsequent negotiations,
ASBCA found that at least some reliance must have been placed on data
31
supplied by the contractor and ordered a price reduction
The inference that the Government might easily meet its burden
under the clause was quickly dispelled, however, in the next two price
reduction cases, both of which were decided in favor of the contractors.
In one, the Government's negotiating position had been based on its own
32
data and not founded upon information made available by the contractor.
In the other, full disclosure might have led to a price decrease, but only
in the event of future negotiations, and such negotiations were not feasible
under the circumstances. 3 3 Government negotiators thus may find that if
30. August 15 was considered as the cut-off date for reasonably available data
because, in American's operation, two weeks to a month constituted the time lag from
the receipt of a vendor's quotation to its recording. Anything received after August 15
was considered not to be reasonably available to the negotiators; the contractor was
only liable for data up to that date which was not disclosed.
31. The Board admitted to the difficulty of proving that the information supplied
by the contractor caused the price increase. The parties do not bargain over specific
items, but only as to total price. Each party draws up its own materials cost breakdown so that if the Government had underestimated some other cost elements, the
overestimate by the contractor would be washed out in the total figures. As the Board
stated: "All this is speculation, of course, as there is no way of ascertaining what
would have happened if appellant had disclosed the additional pricing data." ASBCA
No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 1 5280, at 24,852-53.
32. FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095, 11113, 66-1 BCA f 5483.
33. In Defense Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA
5604, the
contract was awarded to the contractor for a total price of nearly $6 million for

telemetry pre-detection systems for use on the Atlantic Missile Range. The original
contract was placed by two-step formal advertising (technical proposals are obtained
initially, and then bids are obtained from those who submitted acceptable technical
proposals). Since the contract was placed by formal advertising, the contract was
not subject to the defective pricing data statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964), except
for changes and modifications in excess of $100,000. See pp. 606-07 supra. The contracting officer found that the negotiated price under a change order was increased
by $400,296 due to incomplete, inaccurate, or noncurrent cost and pricing data, and
reduced the contract by that amount pursuant to the Price Reduction for Defective
Cost or Pricing Data clause in the contract. Defense Electronics' pricing data was
incomplete in that it did not contain pertinent data pertaining to the costs of certain
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/6
conversion kits. However, the Government was unable to prove that the nondisclosure
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they desire to insure a meeting of their burden of proof in the event
a claim under the clause arises, they must choose between relying on the
contractor's data and forgoing an independent analysis, and relying on
their own independently obtained information and perhaps forfeiting a
price reduction even though deficient data had been supplied by the
contractor.8 4 The choice is hardly clear cut, since the cases illustrate that
the Government may use both its own information and that disclosed
by the contractor and still be entitled to a reduction. The more that the
Government uses its own data, however, the more difficult it will be to
sustain its burden.

III.

COST AND PRICING DATA

What is meant by cost and pricing data is one of the questions that was

left unanswered by both the pre-statutory and the current clauses. Under
ASPR 3.807-3(e) cost or pricing data is defined as:

that portion of the contractor's submission which is factual. The
requirement for "cost or pricing data" subject to certification is
satisfied when all facts reasonably available to the contractor up to the
time of agreement on price and which might reasonably be expected
to affect the price negotiations are accurately disclosed to the
contracting officer or his representative. .

.

. Cost or pricing data,

being factual, is that type of information which can be verified.
Because the contractor's certificate pertains to "cost or pricing data,"
it does not make representations as to the accuracy of the contractor's
judgment as to the estimated portion of future costs or projections.
It does, however, apply to the data upon which the contractor's judgment is based. This distinction between fact and judgment should be
clearly understood.35

As might have been safely predicted, the Board adopted this broad
definition of cost or pricing data, one which covers virtually any factual
information available to the contractor at the time of the negotiations.
But it also went further by addressing itself to the relevant question
of availability of the data to the contract negotiators. ASBCA determined,
in American Bosch Arma Corp., 3 6 which was decided under a pre-statutory
clause requiring "reasonably available" cost or pricing data, that a one
month period was needed from the time the contractor received the
vendor's quotations to the time the negotiators could use them in arriving
at the target price. Hence the contractor was not responsible for any
of such data caused any increase in the negotiated price adjustment. In the circumstances of this case it was apparent that there would not be a price reduction without

further price negotiations, and such negotiations were not practicable before the bid
opening date.

34. Such a dilemma has been suggested by Braemer, Recent Developments in
Government Contract Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 1057, 1069 (1967).
35. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3(e) (1967) (Cost or pricing data).
Published by Villanova
University
Schoolf"of5280.
Law Digital Repository, 1968
36. ASBCA
No.Charles
10305,Widger
65-2 BCA

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 6
SPRING

1968]

COMMENTS

data received within one month of the date that the certificate of current
pricing was executed. In FMC Corp.,8 7 where the Board again made a
determination as to the lag period, data not within the normal documentation channels of FMC within two weeks of negotiation was considered
not reasonably available.3 8
The certificate of current pricing now in use does not contain the
words "reasonably available" as did the pre-statutory clause; instead it
refers to disclosure of data which is available "as of the date of execution
of this certificate." 39 This requirement is unrealistic in that it fails to
recognize the necessary interim between the time a contractor obtains information and the time at which he is able to forward it to his negotiator.4 °
Based on the Board's recognition of the realities of intra-corporate communication, as evidenced in American Bosch Arma Corp., FMC Corp.,
and Defense Electronics, Inc., it is probable that ASBCA will read the
phrase "reasonably available" into the present certificate. Nevertheless,
the regulations presently state that the date of the certificate should be,
as a general rule, "the date when the contract price was agreed to."14'
For the abovestated reasons, it would seem advisable to alter the regulation to permit contractors to date the certificate as of the time when
the data is really current, complete, and accurate, rather than subject
the contractor to the risk of an ad hoc determination as to the availability
of information.
The danger of withholding any information that might constitute
"facts . . . which might reasonably be expected to affect the price nego-

tiation" was brought to light in Cutler-Hammer, Inc. 42 In that case, each

37. ASBCA Nos. 10095, 11113, 66-1 BCA 5483.
38. Id. at 25,702.
39. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-4 (1967) (Certificate of current cost or pricing
data). When a certificate of cost or pricing data is required in accordance with this
regulation, a certificate in the form below should be included in the contract file:
CERTIFICATE OF CURRENT COST OR PRICING DATA
(OCTOBER 1964)
This is to certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, cost or pricing
data submitted to the Contracting Officer or his representative in support
of ---------are accurate, complete and current as of the date
of execution of this certificate.
Firm -..-----------------...--.-.-. .......------------..
. .
N a m e --- ------.-..-.-.-.-.----------------------........
Title - .......................................
- -- -.
Date of Execution
Id,
40. The enormity of the task of preparing a complicated cost estimate prevents
a new price or quotation from being instantaneously reflected on the estimate. Vendors'
quotations must be received, examined, compared with others, posted, and ultimately
transmitted to negotiators. Checking and rechecking by various people is time consuming but essential for the preparation of an accurate cost estimate.
41. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-4 (1967) (Certificate of current cost or pricing data).
42. ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA 6432. The case is presently before the Court
of Claims for review: No. 364-67.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/6
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of nine airborne electronic analysis systems which were the subject matter
of the procurement required antennas, and the contractor chose a particular model, for acceptable technical reasons, which had a restricted
availability of sources. Cutler-Hammer received but one quotation which
compared favorably with its own in-house cost estimate. Immediately
prior to the commencement of negotiations Cutler-Hammer received another proposal, from Transco Products Co., which it felt was so ridiculously low and inconsistent with actual cost experience that it did not
recognize it as a valid proposal, and consequently purposely failed to
mention its receipt to the Government negotiators. It was only after the
completion of negotiations that Cutler-Hammer received Transco's technical data and decided to take "a calculated risk" by awarding a contract
for one set of antennas to Transco. Transco's work proved satisfactory,
and it was eventually awarded all nine sets. The Government's argument
that it would have delayed execution of the contract until more information
was available about Transco was rejected as implausible because of its
urgent need for the procurement. However, the Board felt that if the
Government had been informed of the proposal the antennas would have
been excluded from the contract pricing structure and reserved for
future negotiation. The case was remanded for negotiation on the issue
since ASBCA felt that it was unable to determine by how much the
contract price should be reduced on account of the antennas.
It is clear that Transco's original price quotation did not constitute
data upon which a price reduction of the entire contract could have
been negotiated. There was, at the completion of negotiations, no basis
for evaluating Transco's technical competence. Therefore the ruling
in Cutler-Hammer, Inc. must be interpreted to mean that any time a
contractor has any data which might be significant from the standpoint
of overall contract negotiations, he must disclose this data to the Government. There is no choice but to read the decision broadly because on the
facts of the case the effect of full disclosure on negotiations was only
conjectural. It is entirely possible that the Government, realizing that
Transco's price proposal was received immediately prior to negotiations
and before any technical evaluation was conducted, would have disregarded this as unreliable and would therefore have arrived at the same
target price. ASBCA assumes that the Government would have excluded
the antennas from the contract pricing structure, or at least would have
conducted the negotiations otherwise than it did. It seems that the Board
fails to realize that Cutler-Hammer may not have been willing, for valid
reasons, to separately negotiate the price of parts at later date and,
as the Government urgently needed the procurement, it is at least possible
that the contract price would have been negotiated just as it actually
was. The Board seems to read "reasonably be expected to affect the price
negotiation" as "might be expected," thereby placing an unnecessarily
burden
onCharles
the private
contractor.
Published byheavy
Villanova
University
Widger School
of Law Digital Repository, 1968

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 6

SPRING

1968]

COMMENTS

IV.

AVAILABILITY V. DISCLOSURE

The "truth-in-negotiating" clause of P.L. 87-653 requires a contractor
or subcontractor to "submit" cost or pricing data under certain circumstances; but whether the submission requirement necessitates disclosing
cost or pricing data to the Government or merely requires making such
data available has presented a major problem of interpretation. This
question was one of the main issues in Lockheed Aircraft Corp.43 That
case involved a $10.5 million contract for the furnishing of MADREC
(Malfunction Detection and Recording Systems) kits for various models
of the B-52 aircraft. Although the letter contract was awarded to Lockheed on May 4, 1962, that concern had anticipated the award and had
solicited a proposal from its subcontractor, Midwestern Instruments,
Inc.," almost three months before. The MADREC system requires a
Model 813LQ oscillograph recorder, which was newly developed by Midwestern for the MADREC program; its design requirements differed considerably from the Model 812L recorder manufactured by Midwestern
prior to negotiations for the MADREC program. The subcontractor's
proposal was thus based on a bill of materials for the earlier model recorder, Model 812L, plus estimates to cover the anticipated differences
between the Model 812L recorder as previously produced and the Model
5
813LQ which had not yet gone into production. 4"
Finding Midwestern's
proposal acceptable, Lockheed made a purchase order, effective May 15,
and the Air Force Administrative Contracting Officer approved it on
June 25. In July, Lockheed submitted its proposal. Subsequent to a
preliminary price analysis, the Air Force pricing team, in September
of 1962, conducted an additional audit of the proposed purchase order
price. The Board found that no information had been withheld from the
team, and that all of Midwestern's files and bills of materials for the
Model 812L recorder had been made available to it. Although a bill
of materials was not yet available for the new Model 813LQ recorder,
the subcontractor offered to submit one in a few weeks, if desired, but
this offer was declined. Thus neither temporary nor partial bills of materials for the new model were submitted to the Air Force.
43. ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA
6356.
44. Midwestern's pricing data is the basis of the dispute and it is the real party in
interest in the case, although the appeal is filed in the name of the prime contractor,
Lockheed. Although the Government has a substantial interest in subcontracts,
including this one between Lockheed and Midwestern, there is no direct contractual
relationship between the Government and the subcontractor. The prime contractor is

primarily liable to the Government for a price reduction in such situations. Whether
the reduction can be shifted to the subcontractor depends upon the contractual relationship between the contractor and subcontractor. See generally J. PAUL, supra
note 7, ch. XIII.
45. The industry considers this practice to be an acceptable method for determining the cost of items never before produced.

It

was also the method used by the

contractor in a case decided earlier by the Board. FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/6
11113, 66-1 BCA
5483, at 25,696.
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Lockheed and the Government held final negotiations between February 26 and March 2, 1963, using the total price approach, all subcontracts
being considered only in terms of their total figures without breakdown.
On April 15, 1963, the letter order contract of the preceding May was
definitized. In the fall of 1963 GAO began its audit of the negotiated
prices of the purchase order awarded to Midwestern. It determined
that the subcontractor's prices were overestimated and that "substantially
all or 90 percent of the material cost had already been incurred by Midwestern" and was reasonably available to that concern prior to the completion of its negotiations with Lockheed in June 1962.40 The Board found
that Midwestern had failed to inform either the Air Force or Lockheed that
it possessed firm prices, as opposed to mere estimates, on these materials,
and that its duty to disclose this pertinent information was not fulfilled.
In so deciding this case, the Board seems to be imposing a more stringent standard than was formerly employed or is desirable. Midwestern's
method of accounting was to accumulate materials cost data on Kardex
cards reflecting the cost history of each component. All of the prices
for each component of the Model 812L were indicated on the Kardex
and as orders were placed on the Model 813LQ, these prices were also
recorded on the Kardex. By the time the Air Force conducted its audit
in September 1962 Midwestern had accumulated a considerable amount
of historical data, all of which was reflected on the Kardex. The entire
Kardex file was made available to, and actually used by, the Air Force;
in addition, bills of materials were offered, but the invitation was declined.
Hence, all data possessed by Midwestern was made available to the
Government.
There is language in each of ASBCA's three preceding cases in
this area which indicates that the only requirement imposed upon the
contractor is to make pertinent data available to the Government. In
American Bosch Arma Corp., the Board stated:
Since appellant made available its . . . records to the AF auditors

who examined them during the period 10 to 17 June and reported
the results of their examination to the BSD negotiating team, we
hold that everythinq that could be found from examination of appel7
lant's records up to 17 June was disclosed to the Government.
In Defense Electronics, Inc., ASBCA said:
When the contractor made data available to the Government auditor
for his use in auditing the contractor's change order price proposal,
that was a sufficient furnishing of such data for the purposes of the
Price Reduction clause, and the contractor was under no obligation
to furnish to the contracting officer personally data not requested
by the contracting officer which the contractor had already made
available to the Government auditor and which the auditor had used
46. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA

6356, at 29,444.

47. American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280, at 24,851
Published by
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and referred to48in the audit report which was furnished to the contracting officer.
FMC Corp. contains similar language. The contractor fulfilled the requirements of the clause on the basis of a stipulation between the parties that
[a]ll pertinent FMC books and records relating to the pricing of
the changes imposed by Modifications No. 2 and No. 6 were made
available to these Government personnel in connection
with the
49
negotiation of Modifications No. 137 and No. 138.
ASBCA attempted to distinguish Lockheed Aircraft Corp. from
American Bosch Arma Corp. by indicating that in the latter case the
Government auditor physically examined the pertinent records. 50 However, this distinction is questionable because the entire Kardex file was
not only presented to the Air Force auditors but was used by them in
preparation of their audit and eventually employed in the preparation
of the Government's target price. It is, of course, possible that the
entire file was not physically examined, but the contractor should in no
way be liable for errors flowing from such oversights or value judgments. There is no language in the clause which indicates that the contractor should be held responsible for the Government's use, nonuse, or
misuse of data presented to it; to hold him liable is to make him a
guarantor of proper performance by Government employees. 5'
ASBCA seems to weigh heavily GAO's findings that approximately
90 per cent of the material for Model 813LQ had already been ordered
prior to completion of negotiations with Lockheed in June 1962. Even
if this is true, the undisputed fact is that Midwestern was unaware of
this because of its Kardex system. No bill of materials was prepared
until completion of performance. The inference from the Board's decision
is that Midwestern nevertheless could have discovered this by drawing
up a temporary bill of materials for the Model 813LQ. However, the
Air Force officer who examined the Kardex file should also have been
aware of this because the basic information which would be used to draw
up a bill of materials would have come from the Kardex. Indeed, the bill
of materials would have reflected no more than the Kardex, albeit in
different form. The clause speaks in terms of data and does not specify
any particular format for the presentation of that data. There is no requirement that the same data be submitted in various ways, but Midwestern actually went beyond what was required by offering to draw
48. Defense Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 1 5604, at 26,202
(emphasis added).
49. FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095, 11113, 66-1 BCA f 5483, at 25,710 (emphasis added).
50. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA
6356, at 29,447.
51. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 10453,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/6
67-1 BCA 6356.
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up a bill of materials. The fact that this offer was declined should in no
52
way reflect adversely on Midwestern.
The Board's decision in Lockheed may have far reaching and burdensome effects for parties engaged in government contracting. No longer is
it safe for a contractor to submit all available data to Government auditors, even if such is actually used. It appears that the contractor must be
sure that the auditors understand the data; it apparently will avail him
little to offer to put the data in more usable form, for if Government
hindsight indicates that there is a variance between the negotiated price
and the price that would have been arrived at had total contract performance costs been known at the outset, the contractor is in great
danger of suffering a loss in the amount of that variance. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. will make it more difficult for the contractor to obtain a satisfactory agreement through good, hard, bargaining, an essential part of negotiated procurement.
V.

SIGNIFICANT

SUMS

Another troublesome question is the amount of increase in contract
price that is necessary to warrant a price reduction. The present clause
calls for a reduction in price when the price has been increased by "any
significant sums" 53 because of defective data, but it gives no indication
as to what constitutes a significant sum. Nor are the regulations of any
help, for they merely repeat the language of the statute in this respect."4
In the first case raising the question, American Bosch Arma Corp.,
ASBCA indicated that it would construe the term broadly. Although that
case dealt with a pre-statutory clause requiring an equitable reduction in
price when any significant data was defective, the Board treated the
clause like the current statutory provision, finding that significant data
is any data that has significant effect on the price. Significance, it held,
is determined by dollar amount, not by a percentage relationship to the
contract price: "How much it takes to be significant cannot be determined
as a percentage of the total price, and we are of the opinion that pricing
data which indicates a reduction in total estimated costs of $20,746 below
what was otherwise indicated is significant pricing data."' ' )
There is no way to determine from the Board's ruling in American
Bosch just how small a sum would have to be before it would be
considered insignificant, but obviously it would have to be extremely
small. The amount held signficant in American Bosch represented only
slightly over one tenth of one per cent of the total contract price, but
the Board chose to completely reject the relationship between the $21,000
overcharge and the contract price. On a $15 million contract, this is
52. Id. at 22.
53. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964).
54. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (1967) (Price reduction for defective cost or
pricing data).
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really de minimis, but ASBCA did not so recognize it. A more reasonable
rule would seem to be that a sum is not to be considered significant unless
it exceeds a specified dollar figure or a set percentage, for example, $50,000
or 10 per cent of the total contract price.56 If an increase in contract
price is under $50,000 and does not exceed 10 per cent of the total, it
would seem, as a practical matter, to be hardly worth the agency's effort
to effect a reduction and attempt to collect it. At the same time, overcharges which would be permitted without a subsequent reduction if a
straight percentage formula were used, would be deemed significant if
over $50,000. It is submitted that such a formula would be far more
equitable and practical than the current ad hoc approach of ASBCA.
VI.

SET-OFF

The concept of set-off is neither specifically accepted nor rejected
by the Defective Pricing clause, leaving somewhat in question the applicability of this doctrine in the area of negotiated procurement. Only
recently, in the case of Cutler-Hammer, Inc.,57 involving a contract for
nine airborne electronic reconnaissance systems for a target price of $24
million, was the issue squarely presented to the Board. 58 Included in the
contractor's proposal were numerous duplications in quantities of parts
purchased,59 resulting in an overestimate of approximately $600,000.60
Cutler-Hammer alleged, and the Board found, that it had made serious
errors, such as the omission of necessary parts, which resulted in an
understatement of some $512,879 in the target price. With some difficulty,
ASBCA decided that P.L. 87-653, the Defective Pricing Statute, was
enacted solely to provide the Government a vehicle for the recoupment
of overpricing resulting from any of the reasons listed therein. In the
absence of a clear congressional intent to the contrary, the Board felt
compelled to apply a literal interpretation to the statute phrased in terms
of adjusting for price deficiencies which tend to overstate the contract
56. Prior to the American Bosch decision, it was suggested that "a reasonable
interpretation would allow a ten per cent increase in the data furnished before action
would be taken by the department or agency involved." Cuneo & Crowell, supra
note 18, at 58. While this is more realistic than the Board's position on contracts up
to $500,000, it would allow extremely large sums to be deemed "insignificant" on
large procurements. Thus, in American Bosch, the overcharge would have to amount
to at least $1.5 million before action would be taken to reduce the contract price.
57. ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA iT6432.
58. Some consideration had been given to this matter in American Bosch and
Lockheed, but the issue was not presented as directly in those cases.
59. It is clear that the duplications were unintentional. Cutler-Hammer was
given an exceedingly short time to prepare its proposal and, in order to meet the
Government-imposed deadline, used employees from other projects who were experienced in formulating proposals by a different method.
60. The Government asserted that the deficient data caused a $613,159 overstatement of target cost, but the Board reduced this by $75,000, agreeing with the
contractor's contention that the prices were erroneously based on larger quantities
than it was expected would be ordered. The smaller the quantities ordered, the higher
the prices. ASBCA indicated that the relevant question is what the vendor would
have quoted for the smaller quantity, not what the vendor actually charged the
contractor. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/6
6432.
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price. The Board cannot be faulted for an analytic reading of the statute,
but it can hardly be complimented for its sense of equity.
In American Bosch certain deficient items of pricing data which
tended to increase the contract price were offset by deficient items which
tended to decrease it. Nevertheless, the Government did not raise the
propriety of set-off in that appeal, so the Board did not specifically consider it. It is true, as the Board noted in Cutler-Hammer, that American Bosch involved a pre-statutory version of the clause so that congressional intent as to the issue of offset was not taken into consideration;
but the fact remains that the Government felt it was proper to offset deficiencies, and the Board voiced no objection to this practice. Further,
the failure of Congress to make mandatory the equitable doctrine of setoff is not to be considered as a rejection of it.
In Lockheed Aircraft Corp. the Board addressed itself to whether
certain omitted developmental and royalty charges could be offset against
overstated material costs:
The obvious answer to the offsetting suggestion is that the equitable
reduction permitted under the clause is intended to cover solely
the cost items concerning which the pricing data was defective. To
permit unrelated offsets would be tantamount to repricing the entire
contract, which is not within the contemplation of the clause. 6'
Although narrowing the concept of offset as it may have been interpreted
in American Bosch, Lockheed made it clear that offset could be permitted
in certain circumstances - where the effects are not "unrelated." The
reasonable inference that may be drawn from this case is that, while
deleted royalties and experimental charges may not be offset against
overstated materials costs, understated or omitted materials costs could
be offset against them. In view of the well-recognized fact that perfect
accuracy in a price proposal package is impossible of achievement, it is
reasonable to assume that the Defective Pricing clause seeks accuracy
of the over-all price and not of each and every component thereof; this
is further buttressed by DOD's negotiation methods, which are concerned
with the total target price rather than part by part negotiation. 62
The legislative history of P.L. 87-653 contains an indication that
ASBCA arrived at the wrong result. In reply to Senator Saltonstall's
query about the effect of the bill on "the average contractor . . .a reasonably honest fellow . . . ...Representative Vinson replied that "a truthful,

honest contractor would have nothing to fear under this bill. It is only
that contractor which is concealing actual information that he possessed
at the time he negotiated that has problems." 63 Senator Saltonstall pursued the question further, wanting to know what happens if an honest
61. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA ff 6356, at 29,450.
62. See American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA ff 5280,
at 24,841-42.
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contractor "makes a wrong guess or something of that kind, that is not
from bad intention but is made perhaps, like all of us who make mistakes."'64 Senator Engle replied: "What happens if he does make a mistake? He doesn't get hurt."6 5 Again, Representative Vinson stated: "I
think no one wants any finality of a decision to be based on erroneous
facts . . . that are not supported by evidence." 66

In spite of these assurances, it is clear from the Board's decision
that honest contractors, like Cutler-Hammer, are going to be hurt if offset
is totally rejected. In the instant case, the contractor overstated the contract price by $538,000 by overpricing certain materials, while at the
same time underpricing or totally failing to include almost $513,000 in
the target price. The net result is an overestimate of the target price
by approximately $25,000, but the Board has called Cutler-Hammer to
respond in damages for the full $538,000, directing it to seek its remedies,
7
if it has any, elsewhere.
The issue of offset was specifically considered elsewhere in the hearings, but it appears to have been misunderstood. Senator Cannon commented that deficient data should not add compensation but rather should
reduce the total price.68 Mr, Moore, vice president of Electronic Industries Association, pointed out that the language of the bill provided only
for a "one-way street," and that it was unfair to refuse to consider the
total context in which a mistake accruing to the Government's benefit
was made.6 9 Senator Symington's reply was: "[y]ou do not want to
make an excess profit even as the result of an honest mistake. ' 70 Later
he asked: "But if you make a mistake, do you feel that you should get
an incentive for it?"7' The issue is not one of rewarding a contractor
for his mistake, but is one of fairness to both sides. Equity should require
that prior to arriving at any downward adjustment of contract price, offsetting adjustments should be made to reflect the amount by which the contract price was understated.72 The Cutler-Hammer case is not unique;
experience shows that many unintentional mistakes, many of them in
64. Id. at 26.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 27.
67, One administrative remedy open to the contractor is to petition the Comptroller General for relief. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964). Since an adverse ruling from the
Comptroller General is not binding on the contractor and does not preclude him from
judicial relief, it may be advisable for him to file such a petition prior to initiating any
court action. 1961 CoMP. GxN. ANN. Rep. 9-10. For a description of the administrative and judicial remedies of the contractor, see GOVERNMENT CONTRACTs GUIDF 11
6002-7044 (1967) ; J.PAUL, supra note 16, chs. XVIII-XX.
68. Hearings on H.R. 5532, supra note 15, at 100.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 101.
72. In the First Session of the 88th Congress, a bill, H.R. 7909, was proposed to
amend P.L. 87-653 by, inter alia, specifically allowing offset. Congress failed to act
on that measure, so its intent on the matter is inconclusive. However, it is certainly
arguable that Congress was merely intending to clarify P.L. 87-653 in regard to offset,
thereby indicating that the present provision should be read to include this equitable
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/6
doctrine.
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favor of the Government, are made in large-scale procurement contracts
involving highly technical equipment. The position taken by the Board
has placed an unfair burden on the contractor when there was no necessity
to do so.73
VII.

CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of this Comment to explore the problem areas
created by the "truth-in-negotiating" certificate, to analyze ASBCA decisions dealing with these problems and, hopefully, to offer constructive
criticism of these decisions through suggestions of more appropriate solutions. The Government justifiably has been required to bear the burden of
proof if it is to receive a price reduction. Although the wording of the
statute does not seem to require it, the contractor must apparently "disclose" all information which may affect price negotiations; merely making
such information "available" is not sufficient. Regardless of the amount
of the total price of the negotiated procurement, the slightest overcharge
may result in a reduction under the clause. At least for the present,
set-off will not be utilized by the Board to reach an equitable result, and
it can only be hoped that the Court of Claims will correct this inequity.
John D. Lanoue
73. The indications are that the Board does not intend to modify its stand. In
Sparton Corp., ASBCA No. 11363, 67-2 BCA ff 6539, the cost of a particular tube
for a sonobuoy was agreed upon as $.70, but the contractor incorrectly listed it in
his Price Analysis as $.95. Each sonobuoy required two of these tubes, but the
Analysis only accounted for one. Hence, although the contractor overstated the price
by $.25 per tube, he underestimated the price per sonobuoy by $.45. The Government
contended that the contractor could not offset the mistake made in the Government's
favor against the one running contrary to the Government. ASBCA stated that
"[w]hatever may be the appropriate rule regarding 'set-offs,' this solution is not
regarded by the Board as one involving that principle." Id. at 30,379. The Board felt
that Sparton had made a single representation as to total tube cost ($.95) and, even
though this quotation was the result of two compensating errors, it actually produced
an understatement of cost. Lest someone interpret this to mean that the Board was
rejecting its earlier inequitable view of off-set, ASBCA stated: "It is not considered
that this is in conflict with previous decisions relating to set-off." Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 6
SPRING

1968]

COMMENTS

APPENDIX
10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964):
(f) A prime contractor or any subcontractor shall be required
to submit cost or pricing data under the circumstances listed below,
and shall be required to certify that, to the best of his knowledge and
belief, the cost or pricing data he submitted was accurate, complete
and current
(1) Prior to the award of any negotiated prime contract under
this title where the price is to exceed $100,000;
(2) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modification
for which the price adjusted is expected to exceed $100,000, or such
lesser amount as may be prescribed by the head of the agency;
(3) Prior to the award of a subcontract at any tier, where the
prime contractor and each higher tier subcontractor have been required to furnish such a certificate, if the price of such contract is
expeted [sic] to exceed $100,000; or
(4) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modification
to a subcontract covered by (3) above, for which the price adjustment is expected to exceed $100,000, or such lesser amount as may
be prescribed by the head of the agency.
Any prime contract or change or modification thereto under
which such certificate is required shall contain a provision that the
price to the Government, including profit or fee, shall be adjusted to
exclude any significant sums by which it may be determined by the
head of the agency that such price was increased because the contractor or any subcontractor required to furnish such a certificate,
furnished cost or pricing data which, as of a date agreed upon between the parties (which date shall be as close to the date of agreement on the negotiated price as is practicable), was inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent: Proided, That the requirements of this
subsection need not be applied to contracts or subcontracts where the
price negotiated is based on adequate price competition, established
catalog or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial
quantities to the general public, prices set by law or regulation or,
in exceptional cases where the head of the agency determines that
the requirements of this subsection may be waived and states in writing the reasons for such determination.
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